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Abstract
Why do some people go to the polling station, sometimes up to several times
a year, while others always prefer to stay at home? This question has launched
a wide theoretical debate in both economics and political science, but convincing
empirical support for the different models proposed is still rare. The basic rational
voting model of Downs (1957) predicts zero participation because each individual
vote is extremely unlikely to be pivotal. One prominent modification of this model
is the inclusion of a civic duty term into the voter’s utility function (Riker and
Ordeshook, 1968) which has been the basis of structural ethical voting models such
as Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006). Another branch
of structural models looks at informational asymmetries among citizens (Fedder-
sen and Pesendorfer, 1996, 1999). This paper tests the implications of these two
branches of structural models by exploiting a unique variability in compulsory vot-
ing laws in Swiss federal states. By analyzing a newly compiled comparative data
set covering the 1900-1950 period, we find large positive effects of the introduction
of compulsory voting laws on turnout. Along with the arguably exogenous treat-
ment allocation, several specification and placebo tests lend support to a causal
interpretation of this result. The findings of this study lend support to the ethical
voting models since citizens do react to compulsory voting laws only if it is enforced
with a fee. At the same time, the informational aspect of non-voting is questioned
as “new” voters do not delegate their votes.
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1 Introduction
Electoral participation constitutes an important research topic in both political
science and economics. Most of the literature can be divided in two branches: the
normative or the positive camp. From a normative vantage point, the decreas-
ing political participation rates constitute an important legitimacy problem for
democracy and might even imply a class bias (Lijphart, 1997). In contrast, from
a positive point of view we still lack a consistent explanation why people go to
the polling station at all. The basic model of Downs (1957) is a starting point to
think about voting in a structured manner but predicts zero participation—which
is inconsistent with positive turnout rates.
A prominent modification of the Downsian model is the introduction of civic
duty and social costs in the utility function of voters (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968).
The idea is that people derive utility from the act of voting since they fulfill their
duty as a citizen1. This assumption is underneath the structural voting models
of Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006). Apart from
modifying individuals decision rule, a strand of this literature argues that there
exists a swing voters curse (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1999). Under incomplete
information less informed voter can be decisive and know this. As a consequence
they decide rather to abstain than to vote for a non-preferred alternative.
This paper cannot answer the question why people vote, since this is a question
about the causes of an effect. But it makes several contributions about the effect
of a cause, namely the effect of the introduction of several compulsory voting
laws. First, it makes a clear statement about whether unfrequent participants
react to cost or duty. Second, it shows that unfrequent voters do not delegate
their votes which questions the model assumptions of (Feddersen and Pesendorfer,
1996, 1999). We use data of Swiss cantons (federal states) to separate the effects
of costs and civic duty by analyzing compulsory voting laws. Both Vaud (1920)
and Ticino (1924) changed their voting laws in the 1920ies. Vaud charged a fee
of 2 Swiss francs on non-voters, Ticino did not introduce a punishment. The fee
in Vaud is more than an average hourly wage for a worker in the steel, machine
and metal industry2 (Siegenthaler and Ritzmann, 1996) and thus more than just
a symbolic sanction.
We find that turnout only reacts in the canton Vaud where voting laws were
1Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 28) list several dimensions of civic duty such as “the satisfac-
tion from compliance with the ethic of voting, which if the citizen is at all socialized into the
Democratic tradition is positive when he votes and negative (from guilt) when he does not.”
2Nominal wages in the year 1921 range from 1.49SFR to 1.78SFR depending on the regional
wage level. The overall average is 1.60SFR.
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enforced by a fee, but not in the canton without a financial punishment. Further-
more, it can be shown that empty and non-valid ballots, which are indicators for
vote delegation and little information, did not increase in the canton Vaud.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the theoretical background
of the voting literature. Section 3 presents historical details of compulsory voting
in Switzerland. In Section 4 our research design is described. Section 5 presents
the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 The Paradox of Voting
Since Downs (1957) seminal contribution to political theory in democratic sys-
tems, economists try to explain why there is even a single voter participating in
democratic elections. In the basic model of two-candidates-election, citizens com-
pare costs and benefits of voting. Costs (C) include information and time efforts
whereas the benefits of a single vote are pB; where p is the probability that the vote
is pivotal and B is the utility difference of the two political alternatives. Voters
vote if
pB > C
but since p is assumed to go to zero as the population size gets large, this implies
that nobody is expected to vote. The equilibrium in this general model contrasts
with the simple empirical observation that still a considerable fraction of people
go to the polling station. To account for this drawback, there have been various
modifications of the Downsian model3.
2.2 Modifications of the Downsian Model
2.2.1 Civic duty
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) modify the Downsian model to include a utility of
civic duty denoted by D. The condition to vote changes to
3Laboratory studies of of the pivotal voting models such as Duffy and Tavits (2008) show that
individuals seem to overestimate that their decision of participation or non-participation would
be pivotal. Furthermore, the relationship between perceived pivotality and participation is very
weak even in small-scale-elections.
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pB − C +D > 0 .
As pB tends to zero, people vote if their civic duty benefit D is higher than their
cost C. In this case, a citizen derives utility from the act of voting independent
of the alternative she chooses. Blais (2000) shows that many citizens think about
voting as a moral obligation. The drawback of this approach is that the value of
D is exogenous and not determined by the model.
2.2.2 Structural Voting Models with Ethical Voters
The structural models of Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni
(2006), based on the work of Harsanyi (1980), incorporate so called ethical voters
and endogenize the voting decision. Individuals do not directly derive utility from
the act of voting. In contrast, they derive utility by following a decision rule which
maximizes the payoff of an aggregate (ie. of their group in the model of Coate
and Conlin or of the society in Feddersen and Sandroni). An important feature of
both models is that citizens differ in their cost levels and since some individuals
face relatively high costs it is not optimal to push them to the voting booth. In
equilibrium there is an optimal cost level D̄ which is a cut-off point stating that all
group members with voting costs lower than D̄ should vote and all others abstain.4
The model of Coate and Conlin is slightly more general because supporters
and opposers can have different valuation of the outcome. On the other hand,
Feddersen and Sandroni allows a certain (random) fraction to be non-ethical voters.
They receive zero payoff from following the group’s decision rule and hence always
abstain. In our view, this is a nice feature since it makes the population even more
heterogenous and captures the fact that some individuals just do not care about
politics.
2.2.3 Structural Voting Models with Asymmetric Information
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) develop a model with costless voting where
people are uncertain about a state variable that shapes their preferences. Informed
citizens know about the state of the world while uninformed citizens only have
a prior about it. In a large electorate, uninformed voters delegate their vote
because they fear to elect the not-preferred candidate (or alternative) in the relative
4We use the notation D̄ to relate it to relate the structural voting models of Riker and
Ordeshook (1968). Coate and Conlin (2004) name this cut-off point γ∗ while Feddersen and
Sandroni (2006) call it σic̄ .
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improbable state. It is therefore an equilibrium outcome that uninformed people
do not go to the polling station although they have strict preferences about the
alternatives. This is in line with the empirical evidence that the likelihood to vote
increases with higher education and higher information levels. In analogy with the
winner’s curse in auction theory this effect of asymmetric information is called
swing voter’s curse (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996).
2.2.4 Predictions from Structural Voting Models
Structural voting models deviate from pivotal voting models with a representative
agent by introducing heterogeneity among citizens. This allows to model non-zero
and varying participation rates. But models differ in terms of their mechanisms
why people go to the poll stations. Two important implications can be tested in
the context of compulsory voting.
First, according to the ethical voting models, turnout should increase if there
is a shock to voting cost because in this case the critical threshold D̄ changes. We
expect D̄ to increase since voting costs decrease for all individuals as non-voting
is punished by a fee. Furthermore, both models assume that civic duty is an
individual rule and cannot be enforced by a central authority: only making voting
compulsory should not increase turnout.
Second, structural voting models with asymmetric information say that some
voters do not go to the polling station as they delegate their vote. If voting is
punished with a fee, participation should rise but among the “new” voters one
expects many uninformed voters. This is in line with survey evidence that voters
are more informed than non-voters. As a consequence, one would expect that
empty ballots or non-valid votes would increase if some uninformed voters are
enforced to vote by a fee5.
5Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) reduce the problem to a information/non-
information trade-off and neglect cost aspects by assuming that voting is not costly. However,
they do not dispute that voting is costly but the analysis wants to show informational aspects
of voting “independent of costs to vote and pivot probabilities.” (Feddersen and Pesendorfer,
1996, 409)
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3 Compulsory Voting in Switzerland
Switzerland is a federal country consisting of 26 cantons. Its current administrative
structure dates back to the Act of Mediation in 1803 when Napoleon ended the
violent conflict between Unitarists and Federalists. A consequence of this treaty
was the reinstallation of the 13 old cantons and the creation of six new cantons6.
After the Congress of Vienna there were six more regions joining the Federation as
cantons. The Act of Mediation gave the cantons the right to establish requirements
for suffrage by themselves (Jorio and Sonderegger, 2007). As a consequence, the
right to vote was constrained by economic, religious and gender attributes. During
the regeneration liberal ideas forced the cantons to extend the suffrage to all solvent
Swiss men. In 1848, the Swiss constitution finally gave all male Swiss citizens the
right to vote.
The central state guarantees the right to vote in the constitution and tries to
unify the cantonal voting systems. Nevertheless, cantons enjoy several degrees of
freedom in the exact design of the voting system. Several federal unities manifested
an obligation to vote. This duty varied in its scope (communal, cantonal, federal)
and in the manner of punishment. The canton of Basel-Land for instance had
a law on compulsory voting from 1863 to 1892 (see table 10 in appendix for an
overview). The last two cantons making voting mandatory were Ticino and Vaud
in 1920 and 1924, respectively (Kley, 1989, 163).
The law on political rights 113/49 from 11/17/1924 was approved by the can-
tonal parliament of Vaud. It stated that participation in federal referenda is com-
pulsory for all citizens under 65 years. Unauthorized absences were punished by a
fee of two Swiss francs which was collected by local police authorities. The revenues
from non-voters varied between 8.000 and 16.000 Swiss francs and were spent on a
fund for poor people and a hospital pool with equal shares 7. The canton of Vaud
abolished its compulsory voting law for the war period between 1940 and 1945.
After the end of WWII in 1945, Vaud quickly re-established compulsory voting
only to permanently abolish it after three years in 1948. This repeated treatment
pattern allows as to disentangle short- from long-term effects on turnout and also
gives us leverage to conduct several post-treatment falsification tests (see section
5.2).
The reason why Vaud introduced compulsory voting was twofold. First, politi-
cians sought to improve civic spirit in Vaud. Second, the cantonal government saw
Vaud as the voice of the French-speaking minority and thus sought to increase its
6The new cantons were former tributary regions of the union Alte Eidgenossenschaft.
7The law as well as a document showing federal revenues from fee collection can be found in
the appendix.
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weight in federal elections.
Ticino was another canton that introduced compulsory voting in this period.
The partial revision of the cantonal constitution from 1920 ruled that voting is a
civic duty8 (Kley, 1989, 163). However, in contrast to Vaud, there was no sanction
for non-voters. It is important to note that this constitutional change was approved
in a cantonal referenda and thus had popular support from the majority of the
affected citizens.
Several cantons did not have compulsory voting laws during the treatment pe-
riod of Vaud and Ticino. This allows us to construct a (synthesized) control group.
We use two specifications for the analysis. In the limited specification we include
only cantons without any obligation on the level of constitution or law. The second
specification also includes cantons with written obligation but without sanctions.
We argue that this does not violate the assumption of Abadie, Diamond, and Hain-
mueller (2010) since we apply a generalized difference-in-difference procedure.
4 Research Design
4.1 Measurement
We use cantonal data from a database that contains every federal referendum
in Switzerland from 1866 to 2009. It provides information on turnout, closeness
(ie. the difference between the two alternatives), and the number of referenda at
election day. The database also includes the number of eligible voters which is
a proxy for the (unconditional) probability of being pivotal. All information was
collected by a research team from the Institute of Political Science of the University
of Bern (Bolliger, Linder, and Rielle, 2010).
To control for other factors driving the participation rate, we collected infor-
mation on a set of covariates9. In most micro and macro studies education has
a positive and strong effect on turnout (Mueller 2005, 314). We use the popula-
tion share of secondary students as a measure for educational level of a canton.
Furthermore, it is often argued that urban people have higher political interest
than rural people. We use the rate of the urban population to control for this
effect. Some studies also find that elder citizens are more likely to participate.
The variables for the share of people older than 50 respectively 60 take this into
account.
8Details were organized in article 34/2 of the cantonal constitution from 1920 which replaced
the cantonal constitution from 1892.
9Table 4 in the appendix shows an overview of the data sources.
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Since data on the economic output at the cantonal level is unavailable,10 we use
the number of motor vehicles per person as a proxy instead. Controlling for the
economic output or a correlated proxy is instrumental since many studies show a
positive impact of income on voting turnout (Ashenfelter and Kelley 1975; Knack
1995). In addition, we include public spending and revenues into our specification.
4.2 Identification Strategy
To identify the causal effect of compulsory voting laws in Swiss states, the empirical
analysis relies on a particular variant of the difference-in-differences (DID) strat-
egy: the synthetic control method (Abadie and Gardezabal (2003) and Abadie,
Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010)). The synthetic control method is designed to
compare the evolution of an aggregate outcome (i.e. turnout) for the unit (i.e.
state) affected by the intervention (i.e. compulsory voting law) to the evolution of
the same aggregate for some control group (i.e. states where voting is voluntary).
Let there be J+1 states in periods 1, 2, . . . , T , where state “one” is exposed to the
intervention, that is, enact a compulsory voting law during periods T0 + 1, . . . , T .
Let Y Nit be the level of turnout that would be observed for state i at time t in
the absence of the intervention. Let Y Iit be the outcome that would be observed
for state i at year t if state i is exposed to the intervention in the years T0 + 1
to T . We aim to estimate the effect of the compulsory voting law on the treated
state (α1T0+1, . . . , α1T ), where α1t = Y
I
1t − Y
N
1t = Y1t − Y
N
1t for t > T0. Intuitively,
the synthetic control method imputes the counterfactual control response for the
treated state i using a weighted average of the control states (j = 2 . . . J + 1). To
compute this weighted average, we define the convex weights W = (w2, . . . , wJ+1)
′
with wj ≥ 0 for j = 2, . . . , J + 1 and w2 + · · · + wJ+1 = 1. Each value of W
represents a potential synthetic control. Let Ȳ K1i , . . . , Ȳ
KM
i be M linear functions
of pre-intervention outcomes. Suppose that we can choose W ∗ such that:
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jZj = Z1,
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j Ȳ
K1
j = Ȳ
K1
1 , · · · ,
J+1∑
j=2
w∗j Ȳ
KM
j = Ȳ
KM
1 .
Then, for t ∈ {T0 + 1, . . . , T}, an unbiased estimator of α1t is given by:
α̂1t = Y1t −
J+1∑
j=2
w∗jYjt
Let X1 = (Z1, Ȳ
K1
1 , . . . , Ȳ
KM
1 )
′ be a (k×1) vector of pre-intervention character-
istics containing all relevant predictors of the outcome variable. Similarly, X0 is a
10Official data on Swiss GDP is available since 1980. Cantonal output is available since 1998.
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(k×J) matrix which contains the same variables for the control units. The vector
W ∗ is chosen to minimize ‖X1−X0W‖, subject to the convexity constraint on the
weights. We consider ‖X1 − X0W‖V =
√
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ), where V
is the (k × k) symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix which minimize MSPE
in the pre-treatment period (see Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) for
implementation details). The synthetic control method generalizes the DID in the
sense that it relaxes the DID’s parallel trends assumption and thereby allows for
heterogeneous responses to multiple unobserved factors and thereby. However, it
is important to note the linearity assumption for the relationship of Y Kj and X0
and, then, to be aware of potential bias due to linear interpolation.
Vaud introduced compulsory voting with a fee. Various authors such as Blais
(2000) argue that the effect of compulsory voting stems from the costs of non-voting
but also from stipulating civic duty. Thus, the treatment effect α1t = θ1t + δ1t
includes two components. To isolate the effect of the fee (θ1t) from the civic duty
effect of the law (δ1t) we can calculate α1t = δ1t for a case where θ1t = 0. We
use Ticino, which introduced compulsory voting without a fee, to calculate δ1t.
Several arguments can be made to justify that δ1t are likely to be equal in Ticino
and Vaud. First, both cantons introduced the law in the 1920’s. Second, average
participation rates vary in both cantons between 20% and 60% in the period 1900
to 1920. Third, both cantons belong to the Latin-descent language minority in
Switzerland and thus cultural factors towards civic duty are similar.
4.3 Estimation
Using the method described above to construct a control group, we estimate the
causal effect of the compulsory voting law in the canton of Vaud. Since some
cantons also had a variant of compulsory voting laws in the relevant time-period,
we have to exclude these cantons from the donor pool; namely Zurich, Aargau,
Thurgau, and Saint Gallen. This leaves us with a donor pool of 17 cantons. We
define the pre-treatment period as the years from 1900 to 1924. We employ a
rich set of controls aggregated at the cantonal level—population size, population
share over 50 and 60 years, respectively, the share of urban population, share of
people working in sector one and two, respectively, per capita public revenues and
spending, the proportion of students attaining a secondary education, and the per
capita number of motorized vehicles—as well as the turnout rates for the pre-
treatment period to make the identifying assumptions described in the section 4.2
above highly plausible. To attain the closes possible match of the first moments
of the treated and re-weighted control distributions of the covariates and pre-
treatment outcomes, we use the several different starting points for the V matrix,
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followed by a nested optimization which combines the interior point method to
solve the constrained quadratic programming problem with the Newton-Raphson
algorithm. For all estimation results, Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010)’s
Synth package for Stata was used.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 displays a boxplot of participation for Vaud and the unweighted control
cantons. The average turnout rates in Vaud doubled after the introduction of
compulsory voting in 1924. In contrast, the abolishment in 1949 decreased partic-
ipation to a lower level than prior to the treatment. The control cantons also show
a higher turnout during the treatment period, although this is less pronounced
than in the canton Vaud. We also note a decrease of the turnout variance in the
treatment period. In the control group, there has been a small increase in aver-
age participation during the treatment period followed by a substantial decrease
in the post-treatment period. Overall participation in Switzerland increased from
58.89% in the period 1911 to 1930 to 60.4% in the period 1931 to 1950 and then
substantially declined to 48.28% in in the period 1951 to 1970.
The values of the covariates also change over time. Tables 1 and 3 shows that
the population average in Vaud and in the control groups increases over time.
Furthermore, it can be seen that the amount of elder people rises. Between 1950
and 1970, the share of people over 50 years is already 29% in Vaud and 26% in the
control group. The transformation of the Swiss economy from an agrarian to ser-
vice scope can be seen in the decling share of people working in the first sector. In
Vaud this number declines from 14% to 7%, in the control group from 14% to 8%.
Interestingly, the average minimal closeness of results in referenda decreased over
time from 28.9% to 16.7 % (Vaud), respectively from 25.39% to 15.27% (control
group). Furthermore, the nominal amount of public revenue and public spendings
in per capita terms rises extensively from pre- to post-treatment from about 80
to around 670 Swiss francs in Vaud and from 60 to 580 in the controls (see also
figure 8).
A comparison of the covariates is presented in figures 7, 8 and 9. In contrast
to the control cantons, Vaud has a large population. Moreover, the share of urban
population is relatively high. In terms of people working in the first and second
sector Vaud lies in the mid-range of the control group. The same applies to the
10
share of older people although this share is growing faster in Vaud than in the other
cantons. We note that Vaud has relatively high public revenues and spendings per
capita.
Vaud  Control
20
40
60
80
10
0
Tu
rn
ou
t i
n 
%
Figure 1: Boxplot of Turnout in Pre-Treatment, Treatment and Post-Treatment-
Period
5.2 Synthetic Control
As can be seen from table 2, the balance in terms of the pre-treatment participation
considerably improves between Vaud and the control group when moving from the
unweighted donor pool to the synthesized control group. Furthermore, the balance
in terms of public finance variables such as revenues and spendings as well as the
balance in terms of education imrproves. But these improvements come at cost of
losing some balance in the sectoral structure of the economy which is – according
to the literature – not a central variable driving aggregate turnout.
The cantons receiving positive weights, namely Neuchatel (.55), Bern (.26),
Lucerne (.11), Fribourg (.06), and Glarus (.02), are only a small subset of the
donor. This result is very common among applications using the synthetic control
method. Also, it is interesting to note that without using proximity as a covariate,
three of the four cantons receiving the largest weights are immediate neighbors to
Vaud.
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Except for population size—Vaud has the largest population of all cantons
but for the excluded Zurich—the balance between treated and synthesized control
group is very high. The imbalance in population size cannot invalidate our results,
since the differences in population size between cantons is fairly time-constant and
therefore unable to act as a time-varying confounder. The high balance is also
reflected in the close alignment of the pre-treatment turnout trajectories of Vaud
and its synthesized counterfactual. Figure 2 displays the result of the synthetic
control method for Vaud. The blue lines on the time line mark the beginning and
the end of compulsory voting in canton Vaud. Turnout in the synthetic control
group and in Vaud differ only slightly during the pre-treatment period. The good
quality of the approximation is expressed by the relatively small mean squared
error of 1.4%. In the treatment period, the gap depicts the causal effect α1t
of compulsory voting on turnout and varies between 15% and 50%. The large
treatment effect variation can be attributed to a relatively stable participation in
Vaud combined with a varying turnout in the control group. Participation during
the treatment period ranges from 47.5% to 91% in Vaud11 and from 26% to 76%
in the synthetic control canton. After the cancelation of the bill, turnout in Vaud
returns to the level of the control group. The quality of the approximation is not
as good as in the pre-treatment period due to the fact that the approximation was
performed for the pre-treatment period and covariates in treatment and control
group might change over time.
To disentangle the treatment effect αt = θt + δt into a cost (θt) and a civic
duty (δt) component, we do the synthesization for Ticino. Table 6 shows that the
approximation is not as good as for the canton of Vaud. There are two cantons
with positive weights in the control group, namely Geneva (.52) and Schwyz (.48).
Figure 3 displays the result of the synthetic control method. We see that the
control group overestimates turnout in Ticino for the whole period and thus our
estimate δ̂1t = 0. Therefore, the treatment effect of compulsory voting comes from
the cost component.
Figure 6 shows the treatment effect with and without including empty and
invalid ballots. It can be seen that there is an increase of empty and invalid
ballots (from 1.4% to 4.5%) after the treatment12. In terms of the treatment
effect with mean 27.1% ,this quantity is relatively small (11.4%) and thus the
number of people who delegate their votes to better informed citizens provides a
minor explanation of our treatment effect. This finding questions the mechanism
proposed by structural voting models that asymmetric information plays a major
role in explaining political participation rates (Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996,
11We exclude the temporary suspension from 1940 to 1945.
12Empty ballots increased from 1.1% to 3.8% while invalid ballots increased from 0.3% to 0.7%.
12
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Figure 3: Ticino: Participation in Treatment and Synthetic Control Group
13
5.3 Robustness Tests
In the previous section we clearly established a big turnout difference in the treat-
ment period between Vaud and its synthesized counterfactual, but we still have to
establish the likelihood of this difference being causal. Following the suggestions of
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), we perform a variant of a permutation
test particularly designed for the synthetic control method. For each canton in
the donor pool, we synthesize a control canton. Obviously, the treatment effect
between the actual control canton and its synthesized counterpart should be zero,
hence the name placebo test. Then, we rank the (absolute) size of the treatment
effect for the treated canton Vaud relative to the placebo effects for all units in
the donor pool. Intuitively, the treatment effect for Vaud should be larger than
all the placebo effects.
As can be seen from figure 4, the treatment effect during the 1925 to 1940 period
is larger than any of the placebo effects. Based on our donor pool consisting of
17 cantons, this gives minimal achievable p-value for this sample which is highly
significant (p < .028, one-sided).
Figure 4: Placebo Test in Space
An alternative to this placebo test in space (i.e. with control units) is a placebo
test in time. For this test, we re-define the pre-treatment period and only use a
14
subset for the pre-treatment years to compute the weights for the donor pool. As
a robustness check, we only use the 1900 to 1914 period to compute the weights
and compare the difference between the turnout trajectories of Vaud and its coun-
terfactual for the 1915 to 1924 period. While large differences in the latter period
would question the findings of the previous sections, a small gap between the
treated and synthesized control unit further strengthens a causal interpretation of
our results. As displayed in figure 5, we find a) only minor differences which are,
in absolute terms, of the same size in the 1900 to 1914 and 1915 to 1925 period
and b) absolutely no differences over the gap in the outcome trajectories when the
full pre-treatment period is used as in figure 4 and when only the first 15 years
are used. Hence, this additional placebo test in time further supports a causal
interpretation of our results.
Figure 5: Placebo Test in Time
Exploiting the long post-treatment period after Vaud definitely abolished com-
pulsory voting in the year 1948, we can perform a third kind of robustness check.
Focusing on the temporary suspension of the compulsory voting law between 1940
and 1945, we recognize that any effects of the law are extremely short-living and
seem to completely cease immediately after abolishment. Based on this pattern,
we expect the turnout gap between Vaud and its synthesized counterfactual to
quickly vanish after the definite abolishment in 1948. Again inspecting figure 2
15
this is exactly what we find: Immediately in 1948, the turnout gap sharply falls to
zero and only very small and erratic differences persist for the next 22 years. This
short-lived nature of the turnout effect is not only theoretically interesting and
bad news for the literature which considers voting to be a habit, but also lends
further credence to the causal interpretation of the estimates.
6 Conclusion
Conventional pivotal voting models cannot explain why people go to the polling
station at all. A popular modification of Downs’ (1957) basic model is the intro-
duction of civic duty as a consumption benefit in voter’s utility function (Riker
and Ordeshook, 1968). It is supported by empirical studies showing that moral
aspects play a central role according to voters’ self-perception (Blais, 2000). This
is the starting point of structural voting models with ethical voters. A very impor-
tant modification of Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006)
is to incorporate ethical voting as heterogenous rule and not as a constant (D)
that varies across individuals. On the other hand, Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996, 1999) model the informational asymmetries across individuals and state
that uninformed citizens delegate their votes to informed citizens.
We show that participation levels in Vaud rise after the introduction of com-
pulsory voting with a fee on non-voters in 1924. Turnout during the treatment
period is relatively stable at 85%. The gap between treatment and control group
varies between 15% and 50%. This result is robust in both placebo tests in space
and time. In contrast, turnout remained stable in Ticino where compulsory voting
was introduced without sanctions in 1920. This supports the view of structural
voting models that ethical voting is a rule rather than just an exogenous term that
can be manipulated by a central authority. We also test whether empty or invalid
ballots increased during the treatment period. We find an effect for some referenda
but the effect size is too small to conclude that informational asymmetries would
play a major role and lead non-informed voters to delegate their votes.
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A Balance between Treatment and Control Group
Pre-Treatment Period Treatment Period Post-Treatment Period
Vaud Controls Vaud Controls Vaud Controls
turnout 44.45 51.06 78.13 56.83 32.83 44.90
population 311516 121108 342957 135677 430115 168485
over50 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.22 0.29 0.25
over60 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.14
urbanpop 0.27 0.20 0.34 0.24 0.41 0.28
worksector1pop 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.07
worksector2pop 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.21
pubrevenuepop 0.00008 0.00006 0.00017 0.00017 0.00067 0.00058
pubspendingspop 0.00009 0.00007 0.00018 0.00017 0.00070 0.00059
secondaryscholarspop 0.00009 0.00007 0.00018 0.00017 0.00070 0.00059
Table 1: Means for Vaud and (unweighted) control group
Pre-Treatment Period Treatment Period Post-Treatment Period
Vaud Controls Vaud Controls Vaud Controls
turnout 44.45 45.92 78.13 51.00 32.83 51.00
population 311516 268753 342957 287273 430115 287273
over50 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.24
over60 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.13
urbanpop 0.27 0.39 0.34 0.42 0.41 0.42
worksector1pop 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.08
worksector2pop 0.17 0.23 0.16 0.23 0.18 0.23
pubrevenuepop 0.00008 0.00008 0.00017 0.00019 0.00067 0.00019
pubspendingspop 0.00009 0.00009 0.00018 0.00019 0.00070 0.00019
secondaryscholarspop 0.00009 0.00009 0.00018 0.00019 0.00070 0.00019
Table 2: Means for Vaud and weighted control group
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Pre-Treatment Period Treatment Period Post-Treatment Period
Min Max Min Max Min Max
population 13803 651283 13716 722256 13144 866144
over50 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.30 0.20 0.34
over60 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.21
urbanpop 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.96 0.00 1.00
worksector1pop 0.01 0.27 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.16
worksector2pop 0.10 0.34 0.11 0.32 0.15 0.33
pubrevenuepop 0.00002 0.00020 0.00008 0.00047 0.00031 0.00124
pubspendingspop 0.00002 0.00022 0.00008 0.00048 0.00031 0.00126
secondaryscholarspop 0.00002 0.00022 0.00008 0.00048 0.00031 0.00126
Table 3: Maximum and minimum means for (unweighted) control group
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B Data Source
Variable Description Source
turnout Voting Turnout in % Bolliger, Linder, and Rielle (2010)
voters Number of Voters Bolliger, Linder, and Rielle (2010)
numelections Number of Referenda Bolliger, Linder, and Rielle (2010)
diffmin minimal difference between alternatives Bolliger, Linder, and Rielle (2010)
over50 Share of People over 50 years on Population SFS (2010)
over60 Share of People over 60 years on Population SFS (2010)
population Population Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
primaryscholars Share of Primary Students on Population Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
secondaryscholarspop Share of Primary Students on Population Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
urbanpop Share of People living in City Hofferbert (1976)
pubrevenue Public Revenue Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
pubspendings Public Spendings Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
worksec1pop Share of Population Working in First Sector Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
worksec2pop Share of Population Working in Second Sector Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
motorpop Number of Motor Vehicle per Person Siegenthaler and Ritzmann (1996)
Table 4: Data on Cantonal Aggregation Level
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Figure 6: Gap between Treatment and Synthetic Control Group with and without
Empty Votes
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Figure 7: Time plot of Covariates
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Figure 8: Time plot of Covariates
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Figure 9: Time plot of Covariates
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Figure 10: Original document listing number of voters and issued fees
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D Synthetic Control: Unit and Variable Weights
Canton Weight
BE 0.26
LU 0.11
UR 0.00
SZ 0.00
OW 0.00
NW 0.00
GL 0.02
ZG 0.00
FR 0.06
SO 0.00
BS 0.00
BL 0.00
AR 0.00
GR 0.00
VS 0.00
NE 0.55
GE 0.00
Table 5: Unit Weights for Synthetic Control of Canton Vaud
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Canton Weight
BE 0.00
LU 0.00
UR 0.00
SZ 0.48
OW 0.00
NW 0.00
GL 0.00
ZG 0.00
FR 0.00
SO 0.00
BS 0.00
BL 0.00
AR 0.00
GR 0.00
VS 0.00
NE 0.00
GE 0.52
Table 6: Unit Weights for Synthetic Control of Canton Ticino
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